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Article 3

President's Page

A Call for a Moratorium on
In Vitro Fertilization
The Technique
On July 25, 1978 at Oldham District Hospital in England, Gilbert
Brown rejoiced at the birth of his daughter, Louise, delivered of his
wife, Lesley, by their obstetrician, Dr. Patrick Steptoe. Louise, an
apparently healthy infant, was the alleged first successful outcome of
an in vitro fertilization. As of the time of this birth, the techniques
used had not been released to the medical profession for the very good
reason that Dr. Steptoe subsequently described at the Pan American
Conference on Fertility and Sterility, to wit: "Lesley Brown was pregnant and we realized that we didn't know exactly why. We thought we
had done exactly the same with the others but we kept failing." 1 The
technique involved the use of a laparoscope to harvest mature ova
from the ovaries of the "egg donor." Previous reports indicated that
various measures were taken to increase the likelihood of finding
mature ova. Human menopausal gonadotrophin was given on the third,
fifth, seventh, and ninth days of the cycle and human chorionic
gonadotrophin was given on day 11, all to encourage superovulation.
Some patients also received clomiphene. Recently, however, these
measures have been eliminated in favor of a "natural cycle." The
laparoscopy is timed to coincide with the peak of luteinizing hormone
levels, usually 20-21 hours after the onset of the LH "surge."
Meanwhile, concentrated sperm is placed on a petri dish under paraffin . If the egg removed by Dr. Steptoe passes a microscopic inspection by his colleague, Dr. Robert Edwards, it is mixed with a 0.2 ml
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droplet of sperm. Fertilization occurs within 12-14 hours. When the
fertilized ovum reaches the 8 cell stage (3rd day) or the 16 cell stage
(4th day) , it is placed in the uterus through a tube inserted through
the cervix, aiming at a point approximately 2 cm from the fundus of
the uterus. The canula is inspected to make sure the embryo is not still
in it but there is no way of knowing if it is, in fact , in the uterus.
Conflicting reports have been published as to the use of hormones
after attempted implantation. The use of norethindrone from two
days before until four days after implantation has been reported. The
use of progesterone by tampon after insertion has been "contemplated," according to Dr. Steptoe, as has the use of prostaglandin
synthetase inhibitors (aspirin or indomethacin) to inhibit uterine contractions. The empirical nature of the technique is emphasized by the
report that the two initial successes of the method were followed by
eight straight failures.
Dr. Steptoe's colleague, Robert Edwards, a reproductive physiologist, is the apparent developer of the chemical strategies to increase
the likelihood of nidation. In their report to the Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Steptoe and Edwards reported that,
as of January, 1979, they had attempted 32 such implants. Four had
been successful but two had aborted spontaneously, one at 11 weeks
of gestation (this fetus was reportedly abnormal) and another at 20
weeks of gestation (reportedly normal except for prematurity). In
addition to Louise Brown, Alastair Montgomery, born in January,
1979 gave the procedure an approximately 6.2% success rate in terms
of the birth of term infants. It has been estimated, however, that Drs.
Steptoe and Edwards discarded 99.5% of all fertilized ova produced in
their laboratories over a period of 12 years because of obvious
abnormality, development beyond the optimum stage, or some other
technical indication. While this may be an exaggerated estimate, still
the "success rate " should be computed to include discarded ova.
The Problem
The benefits of in vitro fertilization would accrue primarily to the
couple in which the woman is infertile as a result of tubal pathology.
Dr. Alvin Goldfarb, president of the American Fertility Foundation,
estimates that there are 650,000 married women in the United States
with this kind of infertility. 2 Current state-of-the-art surgery could
result in term pregnancies for only about 30% of such women. This
would leave approximately 455,000 infertile women who might envisage in vitro fertilization as their only recourse . This number is likely to
increase, rather than decrease, because of certain developments in the
society_ These would include 1) the pandemic of venereal disease with
its attendant increase in pelvic inflammatory disease; 2) increase in
late childbearing; and 3) tubal disease related to the widespread use in
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intrauterine devices. There will be, in addition, large numbers of
women who have been sterilized by the deliberate production of oviductal obstruction who will decide for any number of reasons that
they wish to have more children. Surgical procedures to reverse a
previous tubal ligation will be effective in only a minority of cases.
The most persuasive arguments for various kinds of technocratic
solutions to medical problems have been the rhetorical appeals to the
dilemma of the hard cases (e.g., abortion as a solution to the problem
of the woman pregnant as a result of felonious intercourse). In vitro
fertilization, even now, is proposed primarily as a "treatment" for the
"disease" of infertility. As Kass has pointed out,3 however, infertility
is not a disease in the usually accepted use of the term. "Infertility" is
a condition located in a marriage, either one of whose partners might
conceivably enter into a "fertile" marriage with another partner. Even
though the abnormality responsible is usually found in only one of the
partners, it manifests itself only when they interact. Infertility is
obviously not always an indication for treatment. Post-menopausal
women and pre-menarchal unmarried girls, for example, are infertile
but not in need of therapy for their condition. If we refer to infertility
as a "disease" in the usual sense, then we disengage it from the
covenant of marriage and in the process, do further damage to the
place of childbearing as appropriate only within marriage . The condition to be corrected is a frustration of a woman's desire for children.
It is not a disease, although it may be a symptom of certain diseases.
Louise Brown's mother was not "cured" of infertility by the
embryo transplantation. Her infertility which was and is due to her
tubal pathology, remains untreated. The surgical reconstruction of her
obstructed oviducts would be a "treatment" of her tubal pathology.
Her desire for children has been fulfilled by the birth of her child by
artificial means. Mrs. Brown's desire to have children was in no way
objectionable or unpraiseworthy; quite the contrary. It is in the context
of a "response to a desire" rather than a "cure for a disease" in which
in vitro fertilization would be appropriately evaluated. In this context,
it will achieve its appropriate priority in a society which has many
urgent and unmet health needs . The diffusion of medical practice over
a broad group of social and economic discomforts has already resulted
in the utilization of significant numbers of physicians in the performance of procedures which are not really "medical" in the strictest
sense. There is ample evidence to indicate that this has left more
important tasks undone.
The Experiment
Although the Steptoe-Edwards achievement was first revealed in a
London newspaper (after the payment of a $560,000 royalty for
exclusive rights), there has been a predictable flurry of grantsmanship
November, 1979

297

in the scientific community to acquire funds to support similar experiments in the United States. The initial and "test case" grant application was submitted for review by the HEW's Ethics Advisory Board by
Dr. Pierre Soup art of the department of obstetrics and gynecology at
Vanderbilt University. It requests approval for studies of human preimplantation embryos to assess the genetic risks of in vitro fertilization.
In evaluating such experiments, the crucial step is to identify the
subject of the experiment. It is not the couple desiring the child who
are the subjects of the experiment, but rather the embryonic and
pre-embryonic human individuals who result from in vitro fertilization. The risks for the woman who is the recipient of the transplant
are minimal, essentially those of any pregnancy. The experiment consists in necessary and deliberate manipulation of the embryo. This
results in an inherent risk of causing malformations which would violate the basic principle of all medical practice which is primum non
nocere. Even with the birth of Louise Brown, human in vitro fertilization remains at a rudimentary stage of development and we have,
unfortunately, no primate studies upon which to base any valid expectations for the near future . All ?ccumulated evidence regarding human
teratology, however, would lead to indicate that the fundamental risks
of in vitro fertilization and manipulation are absolutely ineradicable.
Perfection of techniques and improved understanding of processes
might be expected to reduce the frequency of developmental abnormalities but never to eliminate them altogether. Unless we identify the
product of in vitro fertilization as an experimental subject who can be
discarded or aborted at the whim of the investigator, it is obvious that
the rights of the experimental subject are violated. The risks of the
procedure, in the instance of in vitro fertilization, do not accrue to a
subject who exists but rather one who is brought into existence
through the experiment itself. The consent to the experiment is a
proxy consent given by the prospective parents who are, in effect,
submitting to unavoidable risks a child who would not exist as an
experimental subject without their prior permission. The basis for
their giving permissi<;m is, as mentioned previously, their "desire" to
have a child. In order to accept this desire as a compensation for
inherent risks in a non-therapeutic experiment we would have to, as •
Ramsey has pointed out "presuppose that the mother has an absolute
right to have a child."4 The fact that parents do not have an absolute
right to submit even existing unborn children to deliberate risks is
illustrated by Kass's example of the un acceptability of a pregnant
woman deliberately ingesting thalidomide. 5 Some, like Ingelfinger feel
that benefits to "mankind" are overridIng considerations even if the
experiments are non-beneficial . 6 Others suggest that proxy consent
can be given for a child upon the presumption that there are "things
we ought to do for others because we are members of the human com-
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munity." 7 Both of these positions, however, would presuppose minimal risks of a much lower order than those expected in in vitro fertilization.
If we accept that the subject of the in vitro fertilization experiment
will be the developing human being who is the result of that experiment, then there is no question that the magnitude of risk would
render such experiments unethical when measured by the st;mdards of
the Declaration of Helsinki, the Declaration of Nuremberg, or even the
more permissive standards of the HEW regulations on fetal research. 8
If the experiment is a success, the parents are the principal beneficiaries. If it fails, the unborn child accepts the risk. It is incredible to
know that AMA representatives have testified before the HEW Ethics
Advisory Board that in vitro fertilization is "ethical" on the basis of a
1978 House of Delegates resolution that required only "informed consent" of parents with no consideration of risks to the unborn.

Legal Considerations
The principal concern from the legal standpoint is an incurred
jeopardy to suits for "wrongful life" if the product of in vitro fertilization is born defective. This possibility is discussed at length by Dr.
Steptoe's colleague, Dr. Edwards, in a 1974 ' article. 9 Following a
discussion in which he downplays the risks of the procedure, Dr.
Edwards goes to great lengths to emphasize the risks of wrongful life
suits for all participants including the "semen donor." The burden of
proof for defendants in such a suit would be the almost impossible task
of proving that abnormalities in the child did not result from the
manipulation carried out in the laboratory. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the New York Appeals Court in two recent decisions (Becker u. Schwartz, Park u. Chessin 47LW2426, 12 /27/78),
while denying the basic "wrongful life" cause of action, nevertheless
held the physicians responsible for damages resulting from the expense
involved in caring for defective children. 10
Another case before the Federal District Court in New York
involves a $1.5 million suit brought against Dr. Raymond Van de Weil
by Mrs. Dolores Del Zio who alleged that the doctor had discarded
"her embryo" which had been conceived in vitro. This raises question
as to "ownership " of a pre-implanted blastula and the physician's
prerogative to destroy it even if he feels that it is grossly abnormal.
Finally, if the "semen donor" in an in vitro fertilization is other
than the husband of the "ovum donor," then there is question as to
whether the child is legally "legitimate " and a possessor of rights of
inheritance. A long English common law tradition, principally resulting from cases related to donor artificial insemination, would place the
legal status of such progeny in doubt.
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Moral Reservations
Although in vitro fertilization is an issue which goes beyond the
issue of artificial insemination, some of the pertinent moral considerations involved in the discussion of the morality of artificial insemination are applicable to the ethics of embryo transplant. May has
thoroughly discussed current teaching on artificial insemination,
including the views of various modern theologians. 11
The basic magisterial pronouncements are contained in three
addresses by Pius XII. These were the "Address to the Fourth International Convention of Catholic Doctors" on Sept. 29, 1949; the
"Address to the Congress of the Italian Catholic Union of Midwives"
on Nov. 26, 1951 and his "Address to the Second World Congress on
Fertility and Sterility" on May 19, 1956. The position of Pius XII is
developed with increasing clarity in these three allocutions. In condemning artificial insemination, whether by donor sperm or husband's
sperm, he alludes to the following considerations:
1. Insemination outside the natural act of intercourse would convert
the "sanctuary of the family into nothing more than a biological
laboratory.' ,
2. Artificial insemination separates the unitive and procreative meanings of sexual intercourse, sundering by human action what is
divinely intended to be inseparable.
3. Artificial insemination entails immoral means for procuring sperm
(masturbation).
4. Artificial insemination using donor sperm violates the marriage
covenant requiring that "procreation of new life can only be the
fruit of marriage."
The only allowable exceptions to the basic prohibitor of AID and
AIR, according to Pius XII, were those situations of AIR in which
1) the sperm was procured by a method other than "acts contrary to
nature," and 2) where the act involved "the use of certain artificial
means designed only to facilitate the natural act or to enable that act,
performed in a normal manner, to attain its end." The licit treatment
of male subfertility would operate within these two guidelines.
Although the principles used by Pius XII in condemning artificial '
insemination are largely applicable to in vitro fertilization, he demonstrates his prophetic instincts, over two decades before the fact, with
the 1956 statement "on the subject of the experiments in artificial
human fecundation in vitro, let it suffice for us to observe that they
must be rejected as immoral and absolutely illicit" (May 16, 1956).
Many Protestant theologians, while basically in agreement with the
papal prohibition of AID would accept AIR, even when involving
masturbation, in the exceptional instance where it is the only wayan
otherwise sterile couple can achieve procreation. Some Catholic theo-
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logi a ns would share this view (e.g., Haring, Curran, Dedek).
McCormick raises a word of caution about such a position when he
states, " If there are problems with donor insemination and in vitro
fertilization, perhaps the first wrong step was AIH itself." 12
Fears for the Future
When one rereads 1984 and Brave New World, it is striking how
many of the futuristic projections of Orwell and Huxley have become
today's realities. With this background , those who speculate about the
possibility that in vitro fertilization may be the first step toward the
substitution of laboratory generation for human procreation cannot
be ignored. Nor can we ignore the possibility of surrogate motherhood
or "womb-for-hire," or the possibility of the sale of laboratory-grown
embryos, or the possibility of federally or foundation-supported
experiments in eugenics. Since we seem to be embarking on perilous
and ever-widening forms of technical manipulation of human lives and
government intrusions into family integrity, strong words of caution
and outcries of alarm will truly serve the total community. A call for a
moratorium on in vitro fertilization at this time will serve science as
part of that community.
- Eugene F . Diamond, M.D.
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